Case law of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (the “Court”) reversed the ruling of the Federal Chamber of La Plata that had declared unconstitutional Article 154 of DNU 70/2023 (emergency decree), which repealed Law 26,737 (known as the Land Law), on the grounds of lack of standing and the absence of the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy.
What is the case about?
The Centro de Ex Combatientes Islas Malvinas La Plata (CECIM) filed an amparo action against the National Executive Branch seeking a declaration that Article 154 of DNU 70/2023 is unconstitutional, insofar as it repealed Law No. 26,737 on the Regime for the Protection of National Ownership over the Property, Possession or Tenure of Rural Lands. The plaintiff argued that the repeal affected national sovereignty and that, as an association of those who “had to take up arms” in defense of the territory, it had standing to act on behalf of a collective-impact right over a collective good, “national sovereignty,” under Article 43 of the National Constitution and the “Halabi” precedent.
The court of first instance dismissed the claim for insufficient standing. The Chamber reversed that decision, admitted the action and declared the provision unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed that ruling.
Key points of the ruling:
The existence of a case or controversy is an indispensable prerequisite. The Court reaffirmed that the existence of a judicial case is a precondition for federal courts to intervene, one that can be verified ex officio at any stage of the proceedings. It also held that the broadening of standing resulting from the 1994 constitutional reform did not alter that requirement, nor did it turn judicial review of constitutionality into an abstract tool for purging the legal system.
Territorial sovereignty is not a collective good within the meaning of Article 43 of the Constitution. The Court stated that territorial sovereignty is “one of the constituent elements of the State” and consists of the set of powers that allow the State to govern a territory to the exclusion of any other state. As such, it is a prerogative of the State, not a good capable of individual or collective appropriation or enjoyment, and it can in no way be classified as a collective good under recital 11 of the “Halabi” precedent. Without a collective good, there can be no collective-impact right and, consequently, no case or controversy that would allow the action to proceed.
The ruling does not address the constitutional validity of the DNU. The Court was careful to clarify that its decision is limited to dismissing the action for lack of standing. It does not express any opinion on the constitutionality of Article 154 of DNU 70/2023, nor does it interfere in any way with Congress’s role under Article 99, subsection 3, of the National Constitution.
An institutional warning to lower courts. The Court included an explicit warning to national courts that, despite the “clear and repeated case law” on the constitutional requirements of a judicial case, “insist on recognizing standing far removed from it.” It noted that such conduct represents a serious breach of the separation of powers and is manifestly inadmissible given the institutional authority of the Court’s rulings.
Why is it important?
- It consolidates and delimits the scope of the “Halabi” precedent: not every invocation of sovereignty, the general interest or public goods allows a collective action; a collective good in the technical, constitutional sense must be identified.
- It leaves open the underlying question, the constitutional validity of the repeal of the Rural Land Law by DNU 70/2023, since the Court did not resolve it. This means it may be raised by parties with adequate standing.
- The warning to lower courts reinforces the binding nature of the Court’s case law on standing and judicial cases, at a time when several courts have significantly expanded the recognition of collective standing.
